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 Trial TacTics
Federal Rule of Evidence 
408 and Criminal Cases
BY sTephen a. salTzBurg
How does Fed. R. Evid. 408 operate in a criminal case? This is a question that few lawyers have had occasion to ask 
in their careers and even fewer have had occa-
sion to answer. There are two principal reasons: 
First, because Rule 408 deals with offers to com-
promise civil disputes while Fed. R. Evid. 410 is 
the rule that focuses on plea bargaining and com-
promising criminal cases; and second, prior to 
an amendment of Rule 408 a number of federal 
courts held that it simply had no applicability in 
criminal prosecutions. Although the cases dis-
agreed on the applicability of Rule 408 in crimi-
nal cases, there were so few cases involving the 
rule that it simply was ignored by most lawyers 
and judges handling criminal cases. Once Rule 
408 was amended in 2006, it became clear on the 
face of the rule that it reached criminal prosecu-
tions, and it also became clear that, even though 
it may not be invoked frequently in criminal cases, 
prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges have to 
understand how it works.
an illustrative case
United States v. Davis, 596 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 
2010), illustrates in part the kind of protection 
that Rule 408 can afford a criminal defendant 
who seeks to exclude evidence of an offer to settle 
what appeared to be a civil dispute. An earlier 
article discussed the case in connection with the 
intersection of personal knowledge, hearsay, and 
best evidence objections, but a brief  description 
of the facts is in order to set the stage for the dis-
cussion of the Rule 408 issue.
Terry Davis had been the national treasurer 
of the Phi Beta Sigma fraternity. He was charged 
with 10 counts of bank fraud, one count of first-
degree theft, and one count of first-degree fraud. 
A jury acquitted him on two bank fraud counts 
and convicted him on all the other counts.
The fraternity, founded at Howard University in 
1914, has university and alumni chapters with more 
than 120,000 members who pay annual dues that 
are deposited in a general fund bank account and 
used to pay the fraternity’s operating expenses. Da-
vis was an elected, unpaid officer of the fraternity. 
He disregarded the fraternity’s policy with respect 
to authorization of vouchers to pay expenses and 
signatures on checks. He wrote checks without ob-
taining approved vouchers, and sometimes failed to 
obtain the cosignature required on the checks.
When the fraternity investigated financial ir-
regularities and discovered what Davis had done, 
it suspended him and installed a new treasurer, 
Jimmy Hammock, who found at least $29,000 in 
checks that had been made out to cash that was 
not deposited in the fraternity’s bank account. 
These checks gave rise to the prosecution.
The rule 408 issue 
Hammock testified as follows: He asked Davis to 
produce the financial records Davis maintained 
on the fraternity’s behalf. Davis provided some un-
used checks and financial reports but no cancelled 
checks or bank statements. He also asked Davis 
why he had written fraternity checks payable to 
cash, and Davis explained that he transferred the 
funds to the fraternity’s payroll account.
Davis filed a motion in limine seeking to bar 
Hammock from testifying about his second con-
versation with Hammock. The defense motion 
quoted the following portion of an FBI report of 
an interview with Hammock:
Sometime between the National Conclave and 
August 2003, HAMMOCK had a telephone 
conversation with DAVIS, during which he 
confronted DAVIS about the checks made 
payable to cash and DAVIS’ explanation 
[that] the money was deposited to the payroll 
account. DAVIS said the money had been de-
posited into the payroll account, but HAM-
MOCK replied “TERRY, I’m telling you, 
I’ve gone through the records and it didn’t.” 
DAVIS then unexpectedly said “what will it 
take to make this go away?” HAMMOCK  
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responded that DAVIS needed to repay “what-
ever you took.” DAVIS asked “what if I split the  
$29,000?” HAMMOCK told DAVIS the 
amount of missing money was in excess of  
$100,000.00, to which DAVIS responded, 
“Oh, I can’t pay that much.”
Davis’s motion relied upon Fed. R. Evid. 408:
(a) Prohibited uses.—Evidence of the fol-
lowing is not admissible on behalf  of any 
party, when offered to prove liability for, in-
validity of, or amount of a claim that was 
disputed as to validity or amount, or to 
impeach through a prior inconsistent state-
ment or contradiction: 
(1) furnishing or offering or promising to fur-
nish—or accepting or offering or promising to 
accept—a valuable consideration in compromis-
ing or attempting to compromise the claim; and
(2) conduct or statements made in compro-
mise negotiations regarding the claim, except 
when offered in a criminal case and the nego-
tiations related to a claim by a public office 
or agency in the exercise of regulatory, inves-
tigative, or enforcement authority.
(b) Permitted uses.—This rule does not require 
exclusion if the evidence is offered for purposes 
not prohibited by subdivision (a). Examples 
of permissible purposes include proving a wit-
ness’s bias or prejudice; negating a contention 
of undue delay; and proving an effort to ob-
struct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
The trial judge rejected the motion, and Ham-
mock testified about a second conversation with 
Davis regarding these checks. Hammock said that 
told he Davis the fraternity had found $29,000 in 
checks made out to cash, none of which was de-
posited in the fraternity’s bank account, and that 
Davis asked “Can we just split this $ 29,000.00 
and make this situation just go away?” According 
to Hammock, he told Davis “[the] amount was 
in excess of a hundred thousand dollars,” Davis 
said, “I can’t afford to pay that amount,” and 
Hammock finished the conversation by telling 
Davis that “Terry, if  you want to do some—nego-
tiate some kind of settlement, you need to talk to 
our legal counsel or our international president.”
Were Davis’s statements Offers to settle?
Davis claimed that his statements amounted to an 
offer to settle a claim that was disputed as to va-
lidity. The trial judge rejected the argument, but 
the court of appeals agreed with Davis as it said 
the following:
There can be no doubt that Davis offered 
to compromise a disputed claim. His offer 
was to split the $29,000 in checks to cash 
he thought the fraternity had discovered. . . . 
Davis did not confess to taking the frater-
nity’s money; he said that he had deposited 
the cash checks into the fraternity’s payroll 
account; and Hammock rejected Davis’s ex-
planation. . . .  It is also clear that the gov-
ernment intended to introduce Davis’s settle-
ment offer in order to prove Davis’s guilt, or 
in the words of Rule 408(a), his “liability.’”
(506 F.3d at 859.)
The court reasoned that “[t]he Rule is meant 
to promote settlements. . . . If  one party attempts 
to initiate negotiations with a settlement offer, the 
offer is excluded from evidence even if  the coun-
terparty responds: ‘I’m not negotiating with you.’ 
It makes no sense to force the party who initi-
ates negotiations to do so at his peril.” (Id.) Since 
there was no doubt that Davis attempted to settle 
the claim that Hammock made on behalf  of the 
fraternity, Davis was within the coverage of Rule 
408 even if  Hammock told him he would have to 
negotiate with someone else.
Did Davis Offer a Valuable consideration?
It is clear from Hammock’s testimony that Davis 
offered to pay one-half of the $29,000 that was the 
subjects of discussion between the two men. No 
one could dispute that $14,500 has value. Never-
theless, the government argued that Davis did not 
offer “valuable consideration” because Davis’s of-
fer of $14,500 fell short of the $29,000 Hammock 
said Davis owed. Thus, the government’s argu-
ment was that the consideration did not qualify 
under Rule 408. The court of appeals made short 
shrift of this argument by reasoning “[u]nder that 
theory, only a settlement offer exceeding the full 
amount of the disputed claim is an offer of valu-
able consideration,” and “[t]he framers of Rule 408 
could not have intended any such thing.” (Id.)
The court of appeals’ reasoning is sound. The 
government’s argument would essentially render 
Rule 408 a nullity because anyone who offered 
less than the other side claimed it was entitled to 
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would not get the protection of Rule 408. This 
would make settlement discussions risky rather 
than safe as the drafters intended.
Was the government’s evidence  
admissible for another purpose?
The government also argued that Davis’s state-
ments were admissible not to prove “liability” 
but for another purpose. The court of appeals 
explained the argument and rejected it as follows:
There is, as the government points out, a 
sentence in the 1972 advisory committee 
note to Rule 408 stating that an “effort to 
‘buy off’ the prosecution or a prosecuting 
witness in a criminal case is not within the 
policy of the rule of exclusion.” FED. R. 
EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (1972 
proposed rule). But it would be a mistake to 
read much into that remark, particularly in 
cases in which the defendant’s actions give 
rise to potential civil and criminal liability. 
The 2006 amendment to Rule 408, which 
made clear that the rule applied to both civil 
and criminal proceedings, drew a distinction 
between civil disputes involving the govern-
ment and civil disputes involving private par-
ties. Under amended Rule 408, a defendant’s 
statements in settlement negotiations with 
government agencies may be admitted in a 
criminal case. FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(2). But 
if the civil dispute was with a private party, 
the defendant’s offer of settlement and state-
ments in negotiation may not be admitted 
in a criminal prosecution when “offered to 
prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of 
a claim.” FED. R. EVID. 408(a). 
(Id. at 860.) 
The court concluded that the government was 
trying to prove Davis’s guilt or “liability” through 
his statements and did not seek to offer the state-
ments for a limited purpose. Thus, the exclusion-
ary rule of Rule 408 applied:
This still leaves the example in Rule 408(b) 
allowing the use of a defendant’s settlement 
offer and statements in negotiation in order 
to prove the defendant’s attempt to obstruct 
a criminal investigation. This example, and 
the statement in the 1972 advisory notes, are 
easy enough to understand when obstruction is 
one of the criminal charges. . . . But even in such 
cases there may be difficulties. One problem is 
that settlement evidence, like other evidence, 
may be introduced for multiple purposes, some 
prohibited under Rule 408(a), some permit-
ted under Rule 408(b). . . . Another problem 
is whether the “obstruction” illustration 
applies only to pending criminal investiga-
tions or also to potential investigations. In 
Davis’s case, for instance, there was no date 
identifying the beginning of a criminal inves-
tigation and there was no evidence indicating 
that Davis knew of any criminal investigation 
when he talked to Hammock. There may be 
other difficulties in some cases. One might 
suppose that if—as in this case—the same 
acts give rise to potential civil and criminal 
liability, any settlement of the civil dispute 
could forestall or influence potential crimi-
nal proceedings. Yet to hold that offers of 
settlement and negotiations in that context 
amount to obstruction would be contrary to 
the purpose of Rule 408 . . . and would con-
tradict the notes of the advisory committee 
in 2006.
Davis was not charged with obstruct-
ing a criminal investigation or attempting 
to do so. We can say with some assurance 
that when he offered to split the difference 
on $29,000, he was not trying to bribe Ham-
mock. All indications are that Davis was pro-
posing to pay the money to the fraternity. It 
may be that an offer of settlement, excessive 
in amount, could be seen as an attempt to 
“buy off” a complaining party. But Davis’s 
offer obviously was not of that sort, which is 
why Hammock rejected it out of hand.
The most important consideration is that 
the government did not introduce the Ham-
mock-Davis conversation for the purpose of 
“proving an effort to obstruct a criminal in-
vestigation.” FED. R. EVID. 408(b). When 
asked at oral argument whether this was the 
government’s purpose, counsel for the gov-
ernment candidly admitted it was not. She 
explained, as the prosecutor had argued to 
the jury, that the conversation revealed Da-
vis’s consciousness of guilt. But that is one 
of the prohibited purposes in Rule 408(a). 
Consciousness of guilt proves “liability” for 
a disputed claim under Rule 408(a).
(Id. at 860-61.)
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The 2006 Advisory Committee Note to which 
the court referred stated that if  settlement offers 
and negotiations between private parties were ad-
missible, this would be contrary to the policy of 
Rule 408 to avoid chilling such negotiations. Thus, 
the court concluded not only that the government 
had not offered the Rule 408 evidence to prove 
an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation, but 
also that there was no evidence in the case that 
Davis was aware of any criminal investigation or 
took any action that could fairly be said to be an 
attempt to obstruct any such investigation.
The conclusion
The court held that the trial judge abused discre-
tion in admitting Davis’s settlement discussions. 
Because both parties had mentioned those discus-
sions in closing argument, the court found it diffi-
cult to determine whether or not the evidence was 
prejudicial to Davis. The court therefore vacated 
Davis’s convictions and remanded the case to the 
trial judge for consideration in the first instance 
of whether the error in admitting the settlement 
evidence required reversal of the convictions.
lessons
1.  It is now clear that Rule 408 applies in crimi-
nal cases as well as in civil cases. The ambi-
guity that preceded the 2006 amendment to 
Rule 408 has been removed.
2.  Parties who desire to exclude evidence under Rule 
408 are required to register timely objections or 
make motions in limine as Davis did in this case.
3.  An offer to settle qualifies under Rule 408 
if  there is a disputed claim as to validity or 
amount and a party makes a genuine offer 
to settle that claim even though the other 
party does not want to negotiate.
4.  An offer to settle a dispute involving money 
involves valuable consideration even though 
the offer is less than the other party believes 
it is entitled to.
5.  There is a difference under Rule 408 when a 
party bargains about a claim with the gov-
ernment and when it bargains with private 
parties. The rule puts potential criminal de-
fendants on notice that statements made to 
government agencies may be used against 
them in criminal cases notwithstanding that 
the statements were made in the course of 
attempting to settle civil claims.
6.  A party desiring to offer settlement discus-
sions for a purpose other than to prove lia-
bility (or guilt) must make clear an intent to 
offer the evidence for a limited purpose. The 
government failed to do so in Davis’s case.
7.  A party desiring to offer settlement discus-
sions to prove something like an attempt to 
obstruct a criminal investigation bears the 
burden of showing that there was such an 
attempt. In cases like Davis, where there 
was no criminal investigation pending and 
no evidence that Davis was contemplating a 
criminal investigation or prosecution, meet-
ing that burden might be difficult or even 
impossible. n
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